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Abstract
Recent advances in machine learning (ML) algorithms, especially deep neural networks (DNNs),
have demonstrated remarkable success (sometimes exceeding human-level performance) on several tasks,
including face and speech recognition. However, ML algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
such test-time, training-time, and backdoor attacks. In test-time attacks an adversary crafts adversarial
examples, which are specially crafted perturbations imperceptible to humans which, when added to an
input example, force a machine learning model to misclassify the given input example. Adversarial
examples are a concern when deploying ML algorithms in critical contexts, such as information security
and autonomous driving. Researchers have responded with a plethora of defenses. One promising defense
is randomized smoothing in which a classifier’s prediction is smoothed by adding random noise to the
input example we wish to classify. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically explore randomized
smoothing. We investigate the effect of randomized smoothing on the feasible hypotheses space, and
show that for some noise levels the set of hypotheses which are feasible shrinks due to smoothing, giving
one reason why the natural accuracy drops after smoothing. To perform our analysis, we introduce a
model for randomized smoothing which abstracts away specifics, such as the exact distribution of the
noise. We complement our theoretical results with extensive experiments.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in machine learning (ML), such as deep neural networks (DNNs), have paralleled or exceeded
human-level performance over a wide range of computer vision tasks, including image classification and visual
recognition [13]. In recent years, researchers have discovered that DNNs are vulnerable to various attacks
(e.g. test-time, training-time, and backdoor attacks). In test-time attacks, which is the topic of this paper,
an adversary crafts adversarial examples— a cleverly crafted human-imperceptible perturbation ∆ that,
when added to an input x, can cause the network to output an incorrect prediction for x + ∆ [25]. These
attacks raise severe safety and security concerns, especially when ML models are deployed in critical systems,
such as face-recognition based bio-metrics [19], malware detection [22], medical imaging [8], and autonomous
driving [10].
In response to these attacks, researchers have proposed several defenses. These methods can be broadly
divided into empirical and certified defenses. Adversarial training [12, 18] is an example of an empirical
defense which has survived the recent onslaught of attacks [3, 18]. Adversarial training borrows techniques
from robust optimization to minimize a worst-case loss in a certain set of perturbations. This defense, how-
ever, has the shortcoming of yielding a computationally expensive training procedure. Adversarial training
scales poorly as datasets and DNNs become larger. On the other hand, certified defenses [15, 4] guarantee
that the classifier’s prediction is stable within some set around the input x, often an `p norm ball around x.
Randomized smoothing [15, 4] is one popular approach for certified defense. This approach converts a
base classifier into a smoothed version through sampling its output from a noisy input distribution. The
procedure typically involves sampling from a noise distribution centered about the input example, passing
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the samples through the classifier, and choosing the label using a majority vote. Unlike many prior certified
defenses [20], randomized smoothing can provide certification in `p norm with lower computational overhead
than adversarial training, and thus scaling up to larger and more challenging datasets such as ImageNet [4].
While showing promise in making models certifiably robust, several aspects of randomized smoothing
require further exploration. First, according to the results from literature, improved certification almost
always comes at a cost of reduced accuracy of the smoothed model over natural examples. Second, the
relationship between the noise level in smoothing and the resulting accuracy of the smoothed model in
adversarial settings is not well-understood. Finally, the empirical evaluation of randomized smoothing
typically requires an unexplained training procedure with noise augmented dataset [4, 15]. It is clear that
certification is a straightforward outcome of smoothing but not of noise augmentation, hence it is interesting
to study the relationship between noise augmentation and randomized smoothing.
In this paper, we perform an in-depth exploration of defenses based on randomized smoothing, and its
relation to noise augmentation during training. We first provide a generalized formulation for randomized
smoothing, including the noise augmented training procedure that precedes randomized smoothing. This
formulation generalizes the smoothing approaches of Cohen et al. [4] and Le´cuyer et al. [15]. Based on
that, we analyze the impact of randomized smoothing and its noise augmented training procedure on the
set of realizable hypotheses. Our main result identifies a critical noise threshold, beyond which the set of
hypotheses realizable on training data after smoothing is a strict subset the set of hypotheses realizable on
training data prior to smoothing.
This result holds a significant implication on the performance of randomized smoothing. A hypothesis
class of reduced size implies that it is easier for the training procedure to converge to the best hypothesis
in the class (by requiring fewer training samples). It is not necessarily the case that all hypotheses in a
hypothesis class which are realizable before smoothing are still realizable after smoothing. The implication
is clear; the test accuracy over both natural and adversarial examples may decrease. Perhaps, this is an
explanation of reduced accuracy of ML models after smoothing.
As such, one can view randomized smoothing as a trade-off between certification and accuracy. A noise
distribution with little statistical dispersion yields a weak robustness certificate, but is less likely to have an
adverse effect on natural accuracy. On the other hand, a noise distribution with large statistical dispersion
improves the certification bounds and decreases estimation error at the risk of reducing test accuracy.
We conduct extensive experiments on noise augmentation and randomized smoothing to support our con-
clusions. First, the recent adversarial attack on randomized smoothing proposed by Salman et al. [21] makes
it possible to investigate randomized smoothing in adversarial settings. We empirically observe that noise
augmentation alone can already provide adversarial robustness, and we also empirically observe smoothing
is not effective without noise augmentation. Then, we study the relationship between training accuracy, test
accuracy, and the statistical dispersion of our noise distribution with a randomly labeled dataset [28]. Con-
sistent with our main theoretical result, adding more noise pushes, in an informal sense, training accuracy
closer to test accuracy at a considerable cost to both natural and adversarial accuracy.
Our main contributions are summarized below:
• Importance of Noise Augmentation. We draw attention to the noise augmented training procedure, which
was earlier only empirically motivated through experiments. We provide a generalized formulation for
randomized smoothing. Our results suggest that the accuracy on a training set for a model trained with
noise augmentation, when compared to a model trained without noise augmentation, is more indicative of
natural and adversarial test accuracy of the same model after the randomized smoothing is applied.
• Noise Augmentation Reduces the Realizable Hypothesis Space. We show that noise augmented training,
when compared to training without noise augmentation, yields a set of a smaller set of hypotheses realizable
on training data. This result has two implications on the performance of randomized smoothing:
– First, the resulting smoothed classifier achieves improved robustness while losing its expressiveness. It
is well documented in literature that this loss of expressiveness can contribute to a drop in accuracy.
– Second, randomized smoothing reduces the generalization error on the realizable set of hypotheses.
While smoothing might come at a cost of test set accuracy, this accuracy becomes closer to the training
set accuracy.
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• Empirical Support for Theoretical Results. Our evaluation on several datasets and architectures provide
empirical support for our theoretical arguments. More importantly, our evaluations with random labels
attribute the above implications to noise augmentation, and indicate that smoothing (without training
with noise) only complements the accuracy and provides robustness certification.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the background material and notation necessary for understanding the concepts
presented in this paper, such as randomized smoothing. In the rest of this paper, we denote vectors in
lowercase bold script, and functions, sets, operators, and scalars in standard script. For a vector z, zi
denotes its ith element. The vector of all zeros in Rd is denoted by 0d. R+ denotes the set of positive real
numbers.
2.1 ML Background and Notation
We consider a setting where we have some input set X ⊆ Rd and some label set Y. The training sequence
is denoted as S ⊆ X × Y, where |S| = N and N is a positive integer greater than 2. The sequence S
is i.i.d. sampled from an unknown probability distribution D, where the marginal probability distribution
of X is a continuous, non-degenerate function. We denote by Q the unlabeled training data. That is,
Q , {x : (x, y) ∈ S}. As necessary, subscripts will be used when enumerating training data; it may be
expedient to write S , {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN )}. Let H be a hypothesis class from which a deterministic
prediction rule, h : X → Y is selected. For example, in a binary classification setting, a hypothesis class H
which appears frequently in literature is the set of non-homogeneous linear classifiers in Rd, i.e. classifiers
of the form h(x) = sgn
{
wTx+ b
}
where w ∈ Rd, b ∈ R. Requiring N to be a positive integer implies |S| is
finite. Requiring N to be a positive integer while enforcing continuity and non-degeneracy of the marginal
probability distribution of X implies that for any pair of samples (xi,xj) ∈ Q such that i 6= j, xi 6= xj
almost surely. Note that when |Y| ≥ 3, |Q| = N and NDim(H) = d, |H| is only known to have an upper
bound. In particular, |HQ | ≤ Nd · |Y|2d [23]. Consequently, within this paper, we will assume labels are
mutually exclusive, and H is sufficiently expressive such that when N ≤ NDim(H), we have |H| = |Y|N .
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM). We borrow much of the notation of this section from Shalev-
Shwartz and Ben-David [23].
The true risk of a hypothesis h is defined to be
LD(h) , P
(x,y)∼D
[h(x) 6= y] (1)
The goal of learning is to find a hypothesis h for which LD is minimized. Unfortunately, the learner does
not know D, but the learner does have access to the training data S, an i.i.d. sample from D. The empirical
risk of a hypothesis h is defined to be
LS(h) ,
1
N
∑
(x,y)∈S
`0-1(h(x), y) (2)
where `0-1 is the 0-1 loss function:
`0-1(z, y) =
{
0 z = y
1 z 6= y (3)
A learning algorithm AH,`0-1 selects a hypothesis from hypothesis class H which minimizes empirical risk
LS . As the 0-1 loss function is non-convex, our experiments – and several applications of machine learning –
minimize a convex surrogate loss which upper-bounds the 0-1 loss. We denote by AH,` a learner which yields
a hypothesis h ∈ H that minimizes some convex surrogate ` function for 0-1 loss. Common convex surrogates
for the 0-1 include the cross entropy loss and the hinge loss. More precisely, the learning algorithm AH,` can
be formalized as:
AH,`(S) , arg min
h∈H
 ∑
(x,y)∈S
`(h(x), y)
 . (4)
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This procedure is known as Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM).
Realizablity and Learnability. We base our definitions of realizability, Probably Approximately Correct
(PAC) learnability and Agnostic PAC learnability from Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [23].
The realizability assumption states that there exists h∗ ∈ H such that LD(h∗) = 0.
A hypothesis class H is PAC learnable if there exists a function mH : (0, 1)2 → N and a learning algorithm
with the following property: For every (η, δ) ∈ (0, 1), and for every distribution D over X×Y, if the realizable
assumption holds with respect to H,D, then when running the algorithm on N ≥ mH(η, δ) i.i.d. examples
generated by D, the algorithm returns h with probability of at least 1− δ, over the choice of examples,
LD(h) ≤ η (5)
The function mH(η, δ) is also known as sample complexity.
Throughout this paper, we assume the realizability assumption holds for H.
Bias-Complexity Tradeoff. We base our definition and analysis of the bias complexity tradeoff from
Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [23].
The error of an ERM algorithm over hypothesis class H, is often decomposed into two parts, approxima-
tion error ηapp and estimation error, ηest. Let h = AH,`0-1(S). Then
LD(h) = ηapp + ηest where ηapp = min
h′∈H
LD(h′) (6)
ηest = LD(h)− ηapp (7)
The approximation error captures inductive bias. This term measures how much risk is contributed by
selection of our hypothesis class.
The estimation error captures how well the learning algorithm AH,`0-1 estimates the predictor h∗ ∈ H
which minimizes true risk LD. The quality of this estimate depends on the size of the training set S, and
on the size of the hypothesis class H.
For fixed distribution D and hypothesis h, this decomposition suggests a tradeoff between estimation error
and approximation error. The term overfitting is often used to describe situations in which approximation
error is significantly less than estimation error. Conversely, underfitting is often used to describe situations
in which estimation error is significantly less than approximation error.
Hypothesis Shattering. It will be useful later to reason about the size of the feasible H. Informally, a
feasible hypothesis is one that satisfies the label assignment for a data sequence; not every hypothesis is a
feasible given a data sequence. Formally, we define the feasible hypotheses as a restriction of H to Q (the
unlabeled training data), denoted as HQ , where HQ is the set of functions from Q to Y which can be derived
from H. That is,
HQ , {h|Q : h ∈ H} (8)
where h|Q : Q → Y is the restriction of h to domain Q;
To assist in counting the size of HQ , we introduce the concept of multiclass hypothesis shattering from
Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [23]. A hypothesis class H shatters a finite set Q ⊂ X if there exist two
functions f0, f1 : S → Y such that
• For every x ∈ Q, f0(x), f1(x).
• For every B ⊂ Q, there exists a function h ∈ H such that
∀x ∈ B, h(x) = f0(x) and ∀x ∈ Q \B, h(x) = f1(x) (9)
The Natarajan dimension of H, denoted by Ndim(H), is the maximal size of a shattered set Q ⊂ X .
Readers may be aware of shattering in the context of Vapnik–Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [26]:
The VC-Dimension of a hypothesis class H, denoted d(H), is the maximal size of a set Q ∈ X that can
be shattered by H. For example, the set of non-homogenous linear classifiers in Rd has VC-dimension d+ 1.
VC-dimension only applies to binary classification. Natarajan dimension is a generalization of VC-
dimension from binary classification to multiclass classification. Indeed, when |Y| = 2 and classes are
mutually exclusive, Natarajan dimension is VC-dimension exactly.
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If H can shatter sets of arbitrarily large size, we say that H has infinite Natarajan dimension. In the
binary classification setting, Sine waves in R, i.e. functions of the form sgn {sin(w · x)} where w ∈ R, is
known to have infinite VC-dimension, hence the hypothesis class has infinite Natarajan dimension.
2.2 Adversarial ML Background
Consistent with the randomized smoothing literature [4, 15], we address an `p-norm bounded adversary
which aims to change the classification output. The adversary searches for a perturbation, ∆ ∈ B,p(x), such
that: h(x + ∆) 6= h(x). The set B,p(x) is often of the form B,p(x) ,
{
z : ‖z − x‖p ≤ 
}
. That is to say
B,p(x) is some `p-norm bounded set of adversarial perturbations.
Adversarial loss refers to the setting in which risk is measured with respect to inputs perturbed by some
adversary. Given a loss function ` and B,p(x), the adversarial loss for a hypothesis h is denoted by ρ`(h):
ρ`(h) , E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
∆∈B,p(x)
`(h(x+ ∆), y)
]
(10)
Contrast ρ`(h) with the natural loss ν`(h):
ν`(h) , E
(x,y)∼D
[`(h(x), y)] (11)
A classifier is said to be B,p(x)-robust if for any input x, one can obtain a guarantee that the classifier’s
prediction is constant within B,p(x). That is, given a set B,p(x), the classifier h is robust at x if, for all
z ∈ B,p(x), h(x) = h(z).
3 Roadmap and Key Results
Before going into the details of our argument, we will provide a roadmap of our paper and a brief overview
of our main theorems and key results. In this paper, we present two novel results:
• There exist distributions for which a learned classifier may have 0% error prior to smoothing, but after
smoothing, the same classification task is no longer learnable with 0% error.
• Natural accuracy can suffer when randomized smoothing is applied to a classifier.
To establish the first result, in section 4, we define a novel generalized formulation of randomized smooth-
ing. Utilizing that general formulation, we show in theorem 4 that randomized smoothing may, depending
on the underlying sample distribution D, impact the learnability on a training set. Predictions rendered by
randomized smoothing, even predictions made on examples in the training set, depend directly on the choice
of noise distribution nσ and the geometry of underlying sample distribution D, but D is unknown.
Given randomized smoothing has such a dependence on D, we instead analyze noise augmentation. Noise
augmentation is a technique which serves as a proxy for randomized smoothing. Predictions rendered by a
classifier trained with noise augmentation instead have a direct dependence on training data S and choice
of noise distribution nσ. Noise augmentation only depends on sample distribution D insofar as S is sampled
from D. Though not mentioned explicitly by name, the noise augmented training procedure frequently
appears in randomized smoothing literature [15, 4]. This may be because of the reasons mentioned above.
Before arriving at the aforementioned theorem 4, we further discuss the relationship between randomized
smoothing and noise augmentation in section 4.1. A small illustrative example of noise augmentation is
provided in section 4.2.
The majority of our theory is developed in section 5 and its implications are discussed in section 6.
We invoke the Natarajan dimension, a multi-class generalization of Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimension (VC-
Dimension), when discussing the size of our hypothesis classes. In theorem 6, we show that beyond a certain
noise threshold ϑQ,n, the classification rendered by a model trained with noise augmentation may not provide
0% error on the training set. We interpret this to mean hypotheses realizable prior to randomized smoothing
are not realizable after randomized smoothing.
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Table 1: Lookup Table for Normal and Laplace Distributions
Distribution fX(x) ψ(z) σ Comment
Normal 1√
(2pi)τ2
e−
1
2τ2
(x−µ)2 z2
√
2τ σ ∈ R+
Laplace 12be
− |x−µ|b |z| b b ∈ R+
After stating our theoretical results, we conduct an extensive experimental evaluation of our claims
from sections 5 and 6 in section 7. Further details regarding our experiments, including our choice of setup
and the design can be found in the experimental section.
4 Revisiting Randomized Smoothing
Making a classifier more robust to adversarial perturbation has been the subject of recent research. A
popular approach to providing computationally inexpensive robustness guarantees is through randomized
smoothing [4, 15]. These approaches smooth a classifier by sampling its output from a noisy input distribu-
tion. The procedure typically involves sampling from a noise distribution centered about the input example,
passing an ensemble of such noisy samples to the classifier, then returning the label which the classifier deems
to be most probable.
The randomized smoothing operation yields classifiers which are B,p(x)-robust for all x ∈ Q. In what
follows, we formalize a generalized procedure for randomized smoothing. We utilize this formulation to study
the impact of randomized smoothing on the feasible set of realizable hypotheses.
Noise Distribution. Critical to the randomized smoothing procedure is the noise distribution, nµ,σ. Cohen
et al. [4] require the distribution to follow an isotropic Gaussian distribution over Rd. Le´cuyer et al. [15]
require a joint distribution of d independent samples from a single-variable Laplace Distribution. In this
paper, we provide a generalized notion of randomized smoothing which subsumes the noise distributions of
Le´cuyer et al. [15] and Cohen et al. [4]. Before stating the noise distribution, we provide the definition of
quasiconcavity:
Definition 1. A function ν : X → R defined a convex subset U of Rd is said to be quasiconvex if for all
x,x′ ∈ U , and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
ν(λx+ (1− λ)x′) ≤ max {ν(x), ν(x′)} (12)
In particular, we define a generalized noise distribution as follows. Let z ∈ Rd; nµ,σ(z) is a d-dimensional
probability density function with the following properties:
(i) Let z ∼ nµ,σ, then µ = E [z]
(ii) µ = arg maxz nµ,σ(z). That is to say, µ is the statistical mode of nµ,σ(z).
(iii) nµ,σ(z) =
∏d
i=1 nµi,σ(zi) where nµi,σ(zi) = e
−ψ( ziσ ) is a symmetric, quasi-concave, non-degenerate
function of zi from R to (−∞,+∞] and σ is a positive real number. In other words, nµ,σ(z) is
separable and symmetric.
(iv) The noise distribution nµ,σ has measure one. That is, 1 =
∫
z∈X nµ,σ(z)dz
In Table 1, we show how several common 1-D noise distributions translate into the general noise distri-
bution nµ,σ. When translating distributions in more than 1 dimension, recall that we assumed nµ,σ to be
separable.
Moving forward, we will adopt the following notation convention: n0d,σ will be written as nσ. When
µ 6= 0d, we write nµ,σ.
The choice of nσ has a direct effect on the geometry of B,p(x). For example, it has been shown that
choosing nσ to be the isotropic multivariate normal distribution yields classifiers certifiably robust in `2-
norm [4].
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4.1 Randomized Smoothing and Noise Augmentation
We begin by stating the definition of randomized smoothing:
Definition 2 (Randomized Smoothing). Given a fixed hypothesis class H : X → Y, a noise distribution nσ,
and training data S, randomized smoothing yields g∗nσ :
g∗nσ , arg maxy∈Y P [h
∗(x+ η) = y] (13)
where η ∼ nσ (14)
h∗ = AH(S) (15)
The smoothed hypothesis, g∗nσ , results from performing the smoothing operation on h
∗ where h∗ ,
AH,`0-1(S). We note the difference between our formulation of randomized smoothing and that of Cohen
et al [4]: Whereas they consider randomized smoothing on an arbitrary classifier, we analyze randomized
smoothing on the classifier which as 0 true risk. As such, our data distribution D, is a distribution over
X × Y.
To precisely understand g∗nσ , we would need access to h
∗(x) for all x ∈ X , but clearly, Q is a strict
subset of X . We further discuss the realizability of classifiers under the randomized smoothing operation
as a consequence of the a No-Free-Lunch theorem [23]. We also discuss the learnability of classifiers when
the training process utilizes noise augmentation. Often, the empirical evaluation of randomized smoothing
typically requires a preceding training procedure [4, 15] with noise augmentation. In this paper, we explore,
through a statistical-learning theoretic lens, the full randomized smoothing procedure, which includes noise
augmentation.
Let us now formally introduce the noise augmented hypothesis:
Definition 3 (Noise Augmented Hypothesis). Consider a hypothesis h ∈ HQ , and denote
hnσ (x) , arg max
y∈Y
∑
x′∈Q : h(x′)=y
h(x′) · nσ(x− x′) (16)
then hnσ (x) is the noise augmented, by distribution nσ, version of hypothesis h where arg max is only defined
if there is a unique maximum.
The noise augmented hypothesis class, HQ,nσ is now defined:
HQ,nσ , {hnσ : h ∈ HQ} (17)
We take sample xi influences sample xj to mean nσ(xj − xi) > 0.
Let us discuss the motivation for our definition of hnσ (x): Suppose the label for any sample in X is
deterministic: For any (x, y) ∈ S, we have P
(x,y)∼D
[Y = y | X = x] = 1. We remark upon the learnability
of certain hypothesis classes under randomized smoothing in the context of theorem 4, the No-Free-Lunch
Theorem of Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [23].
Theorem 4 (No-free-lunch theorem [23]). Let A be any learning algorithm for the task of binary classification
with respect to the 0 − 1 loss `0-1 over a domain X . Let the number of training samples N be any number
smaller than |X |2 . Then, there exists a distribution D over X × {0, 1} such that
1. There exists a function f : X → {0, 1} with LD(f) = 0.
2. With probability of at least 1/7 over the choice of S sampled from D, we have that LD(A(S)) ≥ 1/8
We now generalize theorem 4 to the multi-class setting in corollary 5. With theorem 4 at our disposal,
the corollary is straightforward to show, and we omit its proof.
Corollary 5. Let A be any learning algorithm for the task of binary classification with respect to the 0− 1
loss `0-1 over a domain X . Let the number of training samples N be any integer smaller than |X |2 , and let
the number of classes |Y| be any integer larger than 1. Then, there exists a distribution D over X × Y such
that
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1. There exists a function f : X → {0, 1} with LD(f) = 0.
2. With probability of at least 1/7 over the choice of S sampled from D, we have that LD(A(S)) ≥ 1/8
Both theorem 4 and its multiclass generalization, corollary 5, suggest the difficulty of learning from an
unknown distribution D. Given a noise distribution nσ, it is easy to construct a sample distribution D,
from which a training set S is drawn upon which a learned classifier would have training error 0, but after
applying the randomized smoothing operation, the same classifier would have non-zero training error. This
suggests hypotheses realizable on training data prior to smoothing may not be realizable after randomized
smoothing.
While the randomized smoothing operation does not guarantee realizability of all hypotheses when σ is
less than a critical threshold ϑQ,n, we show in section 6 that a proxy for randomized smoothing does yield
realizable hypotheses in exactly the same setting.
The realizability of this proxy on the training data has a dependency on σ, and only depends on D
insofar as S is drawn from D. Precisely, the proxy for f to which we are referring is a convolution of the
noise distribution with the samples we do have access to. Compared to randomized smoothing, to articulate
a decision rule learned from the noise augmented hypothesis class, the learner does not require access to
distribution D. Therein lies the motivation for the analysis of the noise augmented hypothesis class as a
proxy for randomized smoothing.
4.2 Motivating Example
In fig. 1, we provide a binary classification example in 2-D which motivates this paper. Consider
S =

([
0
1/2
]
,−1
)
,
([
−1
1/2
]
,+1
)
,
([
1/4
1/2
]
,+1
)
,([
1/2
5/2
]
,+1
)
,
([
−13/10
−17/10
]
,+1
)
,
([
1/2
−1
]
,+1
)
,([
1/20
5/2
]
,+1
)
,
([
−2
−17/10
]
,+1
)
,
(
[ 10 ],+1
)

where only the first point is labeled with −1, and let nµ,σ be the uniform distribution:
nµ,σ(z) ,
{
1
σ2pi ‖z − µ‖2 < σ
0 otherwise
(18)
Statistical dispersion of this distribution is tuned by σ. In fig. 1, we plot S. Samples labeled with +1 are
marked with a +. Samples labeled with −1 are marked with a −. We plot the hypothesis h∗nσ ∈ HQ,nσ which
minimizes empirical risk LS . That is, we are plotting arg minh∈HQ,nσ LS(h). With color blue, we shade the
region of R2 in which all points are classified as +1. Color red shades the −1 region. In color off-white, the
region in which there exists no influence from any point in S. In color gray, we denote the region in which
points are influence by both classes, but the net result is an undefined classification.
Let us now discuss what occurs when σ changes. For σ = 123 , we see the hypothesis class HQ,n 1
23
can
realize S. That is, we can achieve training error 0.
For σ = 121 , we see the hypothesis class HQ,n 1
21
can no longer realize S. It is apparent the classification of
individual samples by h∗n 1
21
= arg minh∈HQ,n 1
21
LS(h) is influenced by the labels of samples near each other.
There exist regions in which points are classified +1; however, no samples in S with label −1 are classified
as −1.
For σ = 12−1 , we see a significant disparity between the the empirical risk of hypotheses h
∗ and h∗n 1
2−1
=
arg minh∈HQ,n 1
2−1
LS(h). There exist regions in which points are classified +1; however, no samples in S
with label −1 are classified as −1.
Across all three values of σ, we notice a trend which we state in informally: When |HQ | decreases, the
accuracy associated with the most accurate classifier in HQ also seems to decrease.
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2 1 0 1 2
2
1
0
1
2
y = + 1
y = 1
(a) σ = 1
23
2 1 0 1 2
y = + 1
y = 1
(b) σ = 1
21
2 1 0 1 2
y = + 1
y = 1
-1
?
1
(c) σ = 1
2−1
Figure 1: For the nµ,σ specified in eq. (18), we plot for sgn
{∑
x′∈Q h(x
′)(δ ∗ nµ,σ)
}
(x − x′) for σ ∈{
1
23 ,
1
21 ,
1
2−1
}
. Notice due to the noise distribution, points are classified (blue for +1, red for −1, gray for
undefined) differently from original label denoted by a marker: + for +1, − for −1.
5 Conditions for Label Clustering
This section lays the groundwork necessary for reasoning about how many hypotheses in HQ are realizable
after randomized smoothing. In particular, we study how σ, nσ and HQ,nσ relate. We use a counting
argument to show that HQ,nσ is a subset of HQ . We discuss the implications of this result in section 6.
Within sections 5 and 6, we assumeH shattersQ andN ≥ 3. This is not very restrictive: Recent empirical
results suggest that even with random label assignment, deep networks can memorize their training data.
A quote by Zhang et. al. [28] put their findings succinctly:
...when trained on a completely random labeling of the true data, neural networks achieve 0
training error.
5.1 Statistical Dispersion and HQ,nσ
We begin with the following theorem, our principal result, which shows the existence of a threshold ϑQ,n
which dichotomizes σ with respect to |HQ,nσ |:
Theorem 6. Let Q be shattered by H and let |Q| = N ≥ 3. There exists a positive real number ϑQ,n such
that
(i) when σ > ϑQ,n, HQ,nσ ⊂ HQ , and
(ii) when σ < ϑQ,n, HQ,nσ = HQ
Furthermore ϑQ,n is the solution to
max σ
s.t.
nx,σ(x) ≥ ∑
x′∈{Q\x}
nx,σ(x
′)
 for all x ∈ Q (19)
Proof. We will first prove theorem 6(i). That is, we will show if σ < ϑQ,n, then |HQ,nσ | ⊂ |HQ |. Because Q
is shattered by H, it suffices to show when σ > ϑQ,n, Snσ , |HQ,nσ | < |HQ |.
Assume, without loss of generality, that −1,+1 ∈ Y. Consider training data S∗ in which all labels yi in
{{y1, . . . , yN} \ {y∗}} hold value +1, whereas y∗ holds value −1.
Then it is the case nx,σ(x∗) <
∑
x′∈{Q\x} nx′,σ(x∗), it must be the case that hnσ (x∗) = +1. As no
hnσ ∈ HQ,nσ can realize S∗ we conclude that when σ > ϑQ,n, HQ,nσ ⊂ HQ .
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We now prove theorem 6(ii): That is, we will prove if σ < ϑQ,n, then |HQ,nσ | = |HQ |:
When σ < ϑQ,n, we have that, for all x ∈ Q, nx,σ(x) >
∑
x′∈{Q\x} nx′,σ(x).
Furthermore, it is not hard to see that for all x ∈ Q, and for any S ∈ Q × Y, the following is true:
nx,σ(x) ≥ |
∑
(x′,y′)∈{S\(x,y)}
y′ · nx′,σ(x)| (20)
Hence, when σ < ϑQ,n, then |HQ,nσ | = |HQ |.
We also state the impact of randomized smoothing on adversarial training accuracy:
In theorem 6, we examined the impact of randomized smoothing on the set of realizable hypotheses within
the natural accuracy setting. In conjecture 7, we conjecture on the on the interplay between adversarial
examples and noise augmentation:
Conjecture 7. Given a noise distribution of the form nσ, unlabeled training data Q, and real number p ≥ 1,
there exists an η such that for all ∆ ∈
{
∆ : ‖∆‖p ≤ 
}
, hnσ (x) = hnσ (x+ ∆). Furthermore, η depends on
Q, choice of noise distribution nσ and p.
In terms of the example shown in fig. 1, theorem 6(ii) captures fig. 1(a) (σ = 123 ), as no point in Q
influences any other, hence |HQ | = |HQ,n 1
23
|. Theorem 6(i) captures figs. 1(b) and 1(c): samples in Q
influence one another. In particular, x∗ as defined in the proof is the point labeled −1. We see that the
number of samples influenced by any sample x varies with σ.
6 Implications on randomized smoothing
Before discussing the implications of theorem 6, we provide the sample complexity of PAC learning, as given
by Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [23]:
Sample Complexity of PAC learning. Every finite hypothesis class H is PAC learnable with sample
complexity
mH(η, δ) ≤
⌈
log(|H|/δ)
η
⌉
(21)
where d·e is the ceiling function.
Given a deterministic labeling function, f : X → {±1}, consider the problem of learning, with hypothesis
class HQ,nσ , from the discrete distribution P ⊆ {Q} × f . That is, consider the following risk minimization
procedure AHQ,nσ ,`0-1(S†) where S† ⊆ P. For any value of σ, f is always Agnostic PAC learnable, but the
same cannot be said for PAC learnability.
When σ < ϑQ,n, f ∈ HQ,nσ , hence HQ,nσ is PAC learnable on distribution P: The approximation error
ηapp is 0, that is to say assuming we picked the best hypothesis h
∗ ∈ HQ,nσ , then for any test set drawn from
P, the test accuracy is 100%.
The setting of σ < ϑQ,n is more intricate. There are two sub-cases:
Sub-case 1: f ∈ HQ,nσ . The learner shows inductive bias by withholding hypotheses in HQ from HQ,nσ ,
yet the learner benefits from a better sample complexity upper bound. The approximation error ηapp remains
0. That is to say assuming we picked the best hypothesis h∗ ∈ HQ,nσ , then for any test set drawn from P,
the test accuracy is 100%, and, we might reach h∗ with fewer training samples than we needed in the case
σ < ϑQ,n. In this case, HQ,nσ is PAC learnable on distribution P.
Sub-case 2: f 6∈ HQ,nσ . Here f is no longer PAC learnable. Here, the inductive bias induced by
withholding hypotheses in HQ from HQ,nσ causes the approximation error ηapp to be positive: assuming we
picked the best hypothesis h∗ ∈ HQ,nσ , then there exists a test set drawn from P, the test accuracy is not
100%. In this case, HQ,nσ is not PAC learnable on distribution P.
A test set within the setting of sub-case 2 is easy to construct: set S† to be S∗ as defined in the proof of
theorem 6.
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If a learner does not have have a priori knowledge of the prediction rule f , by smoothing, the learner
runs the risk of losing the ability to realize f . When σ > ϑQ,n, the learner gains robustness, but is putting
up accuracy as collateral.
Making an analogy: If setting σ < ϑQ,n is buying a treasury bond, then σ > ϑQ,n is buying penny stocks.
One is low-risk, low-reward, the other is high-risk high-reward, but instead of money, the learner is risking
the ability to guarantee 100% test-accuracy for both robustness and a training procedure with fewer samples.
7 Evaluation
We conduct extensive experiments on noise augmentation and randomized smoothing to support our con-
clusions from section 6. In particular, we design the experiments to answer three research questions:
• Does training with noise augmentation affect the performance of randomized smoothing in terms of both
natural and adversarial accuracy?
• When the Gaussian distribution is used as the noise distribution nσ in both noise augmentation and
randomized smoothing, how does varying the scaling parameter, σ, affect performance of the learned
classifier?
• When the Gaussian distribution is used as the noise distribution nσ, how does varying σ affect HQ,nσ?
Our principal interest lies in examining |HQ,nσ |.
Previous approaches have studied randomized smoothing in terms of certified accuracy, natural accuracy,
and robustness guarantees [4]. In this work, we build on previous results and take the novel approach of
systematically studying the impact of randomized smoothing and noise augmentation on generalization and
adversarial accuracy.
7.1 Experimental Highlights
In this section, we will provide a brief overview to the answers of the above three questions and provide
insight to the underlying experiments. The evaluation is conducted on four datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10,
GTSRB, and ImageNet. We describe these datasets in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
1. Does training with noise augmentation affect the performance of randomized smoothing
in terms of both natural and adversarial accuracy? To answer this question, for each dataset, we
apply randomized smoothing to two classifiers of the same architecture. One classifier is trained without noise
augmentation. The other is trained with noise augmentation. For each dataset, we compare the performance
of the two classifiers. Then, we consider the models that are trained with noise augmentation but not
smoothed. Empirical results from section 7.3 highlight that noise augmentation improve both the accuracy
and robustness of the smoothed classifier. These results support our argument that noise augmentation may
yield realizable hypotheses which are not realizable under smoothing.
2. When the Gaussian distribution is used as the noise distribution in both noise augmenta-
tion and randomized smoothing, how does varying the scaling parameter, σ, affect performance
of the learned classifier? To answer this question, we evaluate the natural and adversarial accuracy of
smoothed models trained with noise augmentation. The results in section 7.4 suggests that, while smooth-
ing comes with a cost of the natural accuracy, this accuracy on the test set becomes closer to that on the
training set as the noise level increases. As for adversarial accuracy, randomized smoothing effectively pro-
vides adversarial robustness, but the accuracy seems to decline as the noise level increases beyond a critical
threshold.
3. When the Gaussian distribution is used as the noise distribution nσ, how does varying σ
affect HQ,nσ? Motivated by the work of Zhang et al. [28], we take a real dataset, and re-assign completely
random labels for the samples in the train and test sets. This experiment helps in understanding the impact
of noise augmentation and randomized smoothing regardless of the underlying noise distribution. As the
random labeling procedure effectively mimics hypothesis shattering on the training set. By overfitting a
classifier to the training set, we can identify a realizable hypothesis. We then check if it is realizable after
smoothing by checking its test set accuracy.
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Table 2: Channel-wise Means and Standard Deviations
Dataset Mean (µ) Standard Deviation (σ)
MNIST (0.1307) (0.3081)
CIFAR-10 (0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465) (0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010)
GTSRB (0.3787, 0.3482, 0.3571) (0.3005, 0.2944, 0.3008)
ImageNet (0.4850, 0.4560, 0.4060) (0.2290, 0.2240, 0.2250)
7.2 Experimental Setup
7.2.1 Datasets
We consider four image classification datasets: MNIST [14], CIFAR-10 [11], GTSRB [24] and ImageNet [5].
The MNIST dataset contains 60 000 training and 10 000 test images of handwritten digits, split into 10
classes. Each image is of size 28 × 28, with a single color channel. The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 50 000
training and 10 000 test images, split into 10 classes. Each image is of size 32 × 32, with 3 color channels.
GTSRB is a dataset containing German traffic signs. Each image within GTSRB has 3 channels and is
resized to 32 × 32. The dataset contains 39 209 training examples and 12 630 test examples, split into 43
classes. The ImageNet dataset contains 1 232 167 training and 49 000 validation images, split into 1 000
classes. Each image is resized to 256× 256.
For each dataset, we normalize each image x by subtracting the channel-wise mean µ and dividing by
the channel-wise standard deviation σ. The values of µ and σ are computed on the entire training set of
each dataset, as given in table 2.
7.2.2 Network and Learning Algorithms
We apply different model architectures to each dataset. A small depth 4 CNN network, a ResNet [9] with
depth 110, a ResNet with depth 20, and a ResNet with depth 50 are used for MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB,
and ImageNet, respectively. Each model is trained by Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with a momentum
parameter of 0.9. An initial learning rate of 0.01 (for small CNN) or 0.1 (for ResNet) are used, with a decay
factor of 0.7 (for MNIST) or 0.9 (for GTSRB) per training epoch. As for CIFAR-10, we use the same network
and settings specified in [4], where the initial learning rate (0.1) is decreased by a factor of 0.1 per 30 training
epochs. For ImageNet, we use the pre-trained models of Cohen et al. [4].
7.2.3 Randomized Smoothing
As we consider `2-bounded adversaries in this evaluation, our choice of noise distribution nσ is the Normal
Distribution from Cohen et al. [4]. In Table 1, we showed how to convert the standard notation for the
Normal Distribution into that of our generalized noise distribution. We refer to the standard deviation σ of
the Normal distribution as noise level.
Therefore, we largely reuse the randomized smoothing framework implemented by Cohen et al. [4] on
Gaussian noise. We randomly draw N = 10 000 samples around each input image to predict its label. Other
parameters are left as default values, e.g., a failure probability of 0.001 is used for the Monte Carlo algorithm,
which is utilized by randomized smoothing as an internal procedure.
7.2.4 Adversarial Accuracy
We define adversarial accuracy as the accuracy under the PGD adversarial attack scheme SmoothAdv pro-
posed by Salman et al. [21]. This scheme is designed specifically for randomized smoothing, and is different
than the normal PGD attack proposed by Madry et al. [18]. Salman et al. [21] report that this attack scheme
finds adversarial examples which decrease the probability of correct classification of the smoothed classifier.
This attack uses k steps to obtain an adversarial example within an `2 norm ball of radius  centered at x.
For all experiments, we apply this PGD attack with 20 steps. For each dataset, we consider four values
of . For CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet, we use 0.25, 0.50, 1.00, and 2.00. For MNIST, we use 1.50, 2.00,
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2.50, and 5.00. We do not report other values of , because the resulting observations are similar. Larger
values for MNIST were selected because its one-channel images generally require stronger attacks.
In a similar fashion to natural accuracy, adversarial accuracy can be defined as 1N
∑N
i=1 `0-1
(
f(xˆi), yi
)
,
where xˆi is the i
th adversarial example obtained by SmoothAdv.
7.2.5 Random Labeling
When examining random labeling, we focus on the MNIST dataset and using the network and hyperpa-
rameters defined in section 7.2.2. To allow for an easier overfitting, the training procedure does not utilize
DropOut – as suggested by Zhang et al. [28]. For each trial, we generate a new dataset by randomly
re-assigning the labels for each image in both the training and test sets.
7.3 Q1. Dependence on Noise Augmentation
Existing works for randomized smoothing require noise augmentation to be used in conjunction with smooth-
ing [4, 15]. In this section, we draw attention to the connection between these two components and its impact
on the classification performance. First, we compare the performance of a smoothed model with and with-
out noise augmentation during training. We characterize the performance in terms of natural accuracy and
adversarial accuracy.
We evaluate the natural accuracy of the training and test sets, and the adversarial accuracy on the test
set to demonstrate the effectiveness of adversarial robustness provided by randomized smoothing against a
norm-bounded adversary. We then repeat this evaluation for the noise levels and datasets discussed in fig. 2.
Several observations can be made from fig. 2, but in this section, we first focus on the difference between
the performance of models that are trained with and without noise augmentation, i.e., the difference between
the solid and dotted lines. First, we notice that at zero noise level, the training, natural, and adversarial
accuracy are the same for the models with and without noise augmentation, because noise augmentation
and smoothing reduce to the normal case. As the noise level used in smoothing is increased, we
empirically observe that models trained without noise augmentation incur a severe drop in
accuracy at a lower noise level σ than the noise level at which a similar severe drop in accuracy
occurs in models trained with noise augmentation. A more insightful observation is that training
without noise augmentation reduces the natural accuracy as smoothing begins to provide desirable adversarial
accuracy.
Second, we consider models that are trained with noise augmentation but not smoothed. We use a
normal PGD attack to evaluate the adversarial accuracy for the non-smoothed models. Figure 3 compares
the performance of these non-smoothed models with smoothed models. As evident in fig. 3, we see that
noise augmentation provides adversarial robustness comparable to that of the randomized
smoothing operation, especially for relatively small noise levels. For instance, the adversarial
accuracy for smoothed and non-smoothed models in figs. 3(e) and 3(g) almost overlap at either small or
large noise levels. Figure 3(b) also shows a less significant but consistent trend.
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Figure 2: Natural and Adversarial Accuracy (%) vs Noise Levels (σ) for Randomized Smoothing with/with-
out Noise Augmentation. Triangular markers denote the adversarial accuracy under PGD attack with the
maximum `2 norm of . We report only one  for each dataset to reduce the complexity of this figure. Dotted
lines refer to the accuracy of models trained without noise augmentation.
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Figure 3: Natural and Adversarial Accuracy (%) vs Noise Levels (σ) for Randomized Smoothing with/with-
out Smoothing (all models are trained with noise augmentation). Dotted lines refer to the corresponding
performance when the model is trained with noise augmentation but not smoothed.
7.4 Q2. Impact of Noise Parameter
In this section, we explore the impact of the noise parameter on the classifier’s performance. In the following
set of experiments, the smoothed model is always trained with the correct noise augmentation, as specified in
[4]. In addition to the natural and adversarial accuracy, we also characterize the performance of randomized
smoothing in terms of a proxy of the estimation error. We define this proxy as the difference between the
natural accuracy on the training set and the test set, i.e., the accuracy that we lose when applying a model
to the test set.
As shown in fig. 4, we evaluate the natural and adversarial accuracy on four datasets by varying the noise
level. The noise levels for each dataset are chosen to show the complete behavior of randomized smoothing.
The adversarial accuracy under four attack levels are reported for each dataset. Note that we did not
explicitly calculate this proxy of estimation error, as it can be easily observed by looking at the gap between
the curves of natural accuracy on the training and test sets, i.e., the gap between curves with round and
square markers.
We now interpret fig. 4 from three perspectives: natural accuracy, estimation error, and adversarial
accuracy.
We begin by looking at the curves for natural accuracy, i.e., curves with round and square markers, which
show that the natural accuracy consistently drops as the model is smoothed with higher noise levels.
Next, we examine the performance of randomized smoothing from the perspective of a proxy of estimation
error, i.e., the gap between the two curves with square and round markers. For all datasets, we see that
while smoothing comes at a cost of natural accuracy, the difference between accuracy on the
test set and the accuracy on the training set decreases as the noise level increases. The test set
accuracy may even outperform the training set accuracy, for instance in fig. 4(a).
Finally, we study the adversarial accuracy that characterizes the effectiveness of adversarial robustness
provided by randomized smoothing (see curves with triangular markers). For a noise level of zero – no
smoothing – the adversarial attack significantly reduces the accuracy as expected. At higher noise levels,
randomized smoothing is more effective and starts providing adversarial robustness; the accuracy under
adversarial attack increases and gradually approaches the natural one. However, the natural accuracy on
the test set is also decreasing as the adversarial one trying to approach it, the adversarial accuracy is therefore
always lower than the sharply decreasing natural accuracy, in the sense that randomized smoothing fails
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Figure 4: Natural and Adversarial Accuracy (%) vs Noise Levels (σ) for Randomized Smoothing. Triangular
markers denote the adversarial accuracy under PGD attack with the maximum `2 norm of .
to provide a satisfactory adversarial robustness before it costs too much test accuracy. We
also observe that the adversarial accuracy declines after the noise level is raised beyond a threshold. This
observation supports our conclusion in theorem 6.
7.5 Q3. Size of the Hypothesis Class
In this section, we explore how the theory within this paper applies to general datasets. Motivated by
Zhang et al [28], we use a set of MNIST examples, to each of which we have assigned a label uniformly at
random from {0, . . . , 9}, as a proxy for general datasets. After constructing this new dataset, we train a
model with the noise augmentation procedure at noise level σ and noise distribution nσ, then we evaluate the
performance of randomized smoothing. The model and parameters we used were specified in section 7.2.2.
With our model trained using the noise augmentation procedure, we plot the accuracy of the classifier with
and without the randomized smoothing operation applied, on both the test and train data sequences. When
plotting the accuracy of a classifier to which the randomized smoothing operation has been applied, we use
the same σ and noise distribution nσ as was applied in our noise augmented training procedure. This entire
process is repeated for 30 trials. Moving forward, when the term original MNIST, when used without a
modifier, means the original MNIST data, with original (non-random) labels.
When σ exceeds a threshold value ϑQ,n, our theory says the set of smooth hypotheses HQ,nσ realizable
on Q will decrease, thereby reducing, in expectation, the accuracy of the best smooth hypothesis in that
class.
It is well-known that clustering-based unsupervised learning techniques achieve respectable accuracy on
original MNIST data. For the original MNIST dataset, examples within the same class tend to lie close
to one another. With noise augmentation on a set of randomly labeled data, this clustering behavior to
continues: As the noise level σ increases, larger clusters of points in feature space tend to have the same
label, thereby reducing training accuracy on randomly-labeled MNIST. Furthermore, the training accuracy
on data when the randomized smoothing operation is applied, is closer to the test accuracy. This may be
evidence for why smoothing and noise augmentation often appear together.
Each model is trained for 200 epochs with an initial learning rate of 0.01, which is decreased by a factor
of 0.95 per epoch. We empirically observe that models trained with noise augmentation have higher loss, as
shown in fig. 5. Note that the model with zero noise arrives achieves low loss within the first few epochs.
Such behavior could indicate the effect of noise augmentation.
The violin plot in fig. 6 shows that a model trained with noise augmentation is a better provides a better,
though still sub-optimal, estimate of the natural accuracy. Note first that the test set accuracy is always
around 10%. As labels are assigned uniformly at random to our MNIST examples, the expected value of test
accuracy is 10%, which is expected as the training and test sets are uncorrelated once we re-assign uniform
random labels, thus the prediction on the test set is no better than a random guess over 10 classes.
We now focus on the training set accuracy; note that the model with zero noise level achieves 100%
accuracy on the training set for all enumerated instances of labeling. This suggests that there exists a
realizable hypothesis within the hypothesis class, before smoothing. However, we see that the obtained
accuracy decreases consistently as the model is trained with larger noise levels, and the estimation error also
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Figure 6: Natural Accuracy (%) vs Noise Levels
(σ) on Randomly-labeled MNIST
decreases as the test set accuracy remains the same.
Apparently, smoothing should not work in this scenario, as close points are not expected to have the same
label. So the training set accuracy with smoothing (blue) is always worse than that without smoothing (red).
We can make the same observations as before, even when smoothing is making the wrong decisions. These
results suggest that noise augmentation indeed reduces the size of the realizable hypothesis class,
in the sense that this procedure makes it harder for the model to realize a given hypothesis,
as we have discussed in section 5. Therefore, we base these implications on noise augmentation, and in
particular, its impact on reducing the realizable hypothesis class.
To summarize, noise augmentation, we have empirically verified theorem 6. Furthermore, we observe that
not only does smoothing reduce the size of the hypothesis class, but we also notice a relationship between
the statistical dispersion, and the size of HQ,nσ .
8 Related Work
Our work mainly relates to the recent research in randomized smoothing. We also compare against other
works that analyze noise augmentation in the aspects of adversarial robustness.
8.1 Randomized Smoothing
Randomized smoothing is a procedure that produces a new classifier from an existing base classifier. It
provides certifiable adversarial robustness by leverages the base classifier’s robustness to random noise.
Several earlier works proposed randomized smoothing as a heuristic defense without providing any robustness
guarantees, for instance from Cao et al. [2] and Liu et al. [17]. Lecuyer et al. [15] proved the first robustness
guarantee for randomized smoothing, utilizing Laplacian noise and its well-studied inequalities from the
differential privacy literature. Subsequently, Cohen et al. [4] summarized these approaches as randomized
smoothing and provided a tighter robustness guarantee with Gaussian noise.
Confirming the tightness of a robustness guarantee from Gaussian noise, Blum et al. recently showed
that, for `p norm-bounded adversaries, p > 2, on high dimensional images where pixel values are bounded
between 0 and 255, the noise comes to dominate any useful information in the images, thereby leading to
trivial smoothed classifiers [1].
Recently, several works highlighted the importance of the training procedure for randomized smoothing.
Salman et al. [21] proposed the first PGD attack for randomized smoothing and thus improved the robustness
guarantee via adversarial training. Similarly, Li et al. [16] improved this guarantee by introducing stability
training to improve the base model’s robustness to Gaussian noise.
However, all of these works did not explicitly or formally explore the relationship between the training of
the base model and the following smoothing procedure. Specifically, they did not explain why randomness
has to be used in both the training and inference time. The subsequent implications on adversarial robustness
16
and classification accuracy were not explained either. For instance, Lecuyer et al. [15] empirically pointed
out that the noise should also be added in the training phase. Cohen et al. [4] also empirically observed
that the same noise level should be used in the training and inference time. We build on both works by
formally exploring the relationship between noise augmentation and randomized smoothing. We also consider
adversarial accuracy and generalization ability. Despite the improved robustness guarantee from Salman et
al. [21] and Li et al. [16], they did not formally explain the connection between the training procedure and
smoothing like we do.
Earlier work from Liu et al. [17] established the equivalence between the training with noise (at each
layer) and Lipschitz regularization, but this explanation does not apply to the implications of randomized
smoothing. In contrast, our explanation in the aspects of the realizable hypothesis class covers both the
connection and its implications. Cao et al. [2] claimed that the noise only needs to be used in the test phase.
This happens when the added noise is small and below the threshold that we found.
We emphasize that we do not compare against randomized smoothing approaches in the aspects of
providing robustness guarantees. Instead, we seek to highlight and explain a connection between the training
and smoothing procedure, as well as its implications on adversarial robustness and classification accuracy.
8.2 Noise Augmentation
Indeed, the training with added noise and its robustness properties have been well studied in the noise
augmentation literature, but not in the context of randomized smoothing. For instance, Fawzi et al. [6]
and Franceschi et al. [7] related the robustness of classifiers from random noise to adversarial examples.
Zantedeschi et al. [27] introduced Gaussian data augmentation and observed that the added noise sometimes
even improve the accuracy.
The above works were referenced in the randomized smoothing literature, but were not sufficient to
explain the connection between noise augmentation and randomized smoothing. In contrast, we provide
an explanation in the aspects of statistical machine learning theory, which covers noise augmentation, its
connection to randomized smoothing, and the subsequent implications on adversarial robustness and natural
accuracy. Moreover, the critical threshold that we found for randomized smoothing explains the observation
from Zantedeschi et al. [27] that the added noise can sometimes improve the accuracy.
9 Conclusion
Randomized smoothing is one of the promising defenses against adversarial attacks on classifiers. The
randomized smoothing technique smoothes a classifier’s prediction by adding random noise to the data
point. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically explore randomized smoothing. We investigate the
effect of randomized smoothing on the space of realizable hypothesis space, and show that for some noise
levels the realizable hypothesis space shrinks due to smoothing. This result could be a potential explanation
why the natural accuracy drops due to smoothing. We perform extensive experiments to empirically support
our theoretical investigation using well-known image classification datasets.
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